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stockpile.' Second, because of the costs of storage, it is by no means optimal even to try to stabilize consumption and price completely. And those analytical studies (e.g., Newbery and Stiglitz [19791) Storage is explicitly modeled in another set of studies that concentrate on the stochastic simulation of various storage rules for a public storage authority. Unfortunately, these rules are most often arbitrary (see, for example, Duloy and Parish [1964] , Reutlinger [1976] ). Further, where supply is economically responsive, the results reflect the irrational way in which producers' expectations about price are said to be formed (see, for example, Sharples [1980] ). In addition, the welfare effects of both the analytical and numerical studies depend at least in part on the unexplained absence of private storage. (For an illustration of the implications of this omission, see Wright and Williams [1982b] .)
Instead of following the welfare implications of arbitrary behavioral specifications, we examine the effects of the introduction of storage as performed by competitive profit-maximizers, who form expectations that are rational in the sense that they are consistent with knowledge by all agents of the structure of the model. The same behavioral assumptions are attributed to producers and are rendered meaningful by allowing for response to economic incentives. In other models of optimal storage, including Gustafson [1958a] and Johnson and Sumner [1976] , the assumption that supply is completely inelastic makes the price expectations of producers irrelevant.2
The introduction of storage is an inherently dynamic phenomenon, although previous analytical studies of market stabilization have not recognized this fact. The approach described in this paper could be used to calculate the welfare effects of changes in storage costs, spoilage, and so forth. The results would depend on the amount already in store in a relatively straightforward fashion. Economy of exposition dictates that we concentrate on the initial condition of nothing in store, which corresponds to the introduction of storage or storability.
1. See Townsend [1977J for a proof of the proposition that the stockpile will be exhausted with probability one in finite time.
2. Helmberger and Weaver 119771 also considered private competitive storage. Their description of market behavior, however, is founded on the erroneous assumption [p, 640] that if current storage is positive, future storage will always be positive. A simple model with integer storage and rationally responsive supply is found in Gardner [1979] ,
I. A MODEL OF A MARKET WITH STORAGE
In our model of a closed competitive economy, consumers, who are assumed to be identical, have an inverse consumption demand for the commodity in question of (1) pt= a +q-CS p>O, P'(q) <O, where Pt is price in period t, and qt is the amount consumed. In a study of ideal stabilization, Wright [1979] demonstrated the sensitivity of welfare changes to the parameter C, which is the Pratt-Arrow measure of curvature used to assess relative risk aversion:
C (qP' (q)/P'(q)).
Assuming that the coefficient of relative risk aversion of consumers with respect to income is approximately equal to the income elasticity of demand for the commodity, or that the budget share of the commodity is small relative to the absolute value of its demand elasticity, consumers are "commodity risk averse" if C is greater than 1.0. That is, consumers would pay for a mean-preserving decrease in the dispersion of consumption of the commodity. If C is below 1.0, the demand curve displays commodity risk preference. 
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The quantity consumed is (3) qt=It-St, where St is the amount stored from period t to period t + 1, and It is the amount on hand in period t:
where xt is production in period t.
Some disturbance such as weather disrupts production in each period. Realized production has the following relationship to planned production:
where vt is a random, serially uncorrelated disturbance with probability density function f(v) of finite variance. Most sources of production instability, including weather, have multiplicative effects on output, rather than the additive effects assumed in much of the literature on production stabilization. Pt is the producer incentive at time t -1 when commitment to planned production x(P1) must be made; production is perfectly inelastic within period t. Producer i maximizes expected profits,
where xit is the output of producer i, gi is his total cost of production, and E denotes the conditional expectation given the information available to all agents in period t -1. Each producer has the same multiplicative disturbance vt. An atomistic producer perceives Pt, which is a function of aggregate production, to be independent of xit, but recognizes the correlation between the disturbance in his own production and the disturbance in aggregate production.4 The firstorder condition for competitive profit maximization is Paul [1970] indicates unit physical storage costs for commodities such as grain are remarkably constant over the observed range of storage. However, the spread between spot and futures prices, known as the "price of storage," is highly nonlinear and is quite negative at small amounts stored (see Telser [1958] or Brennan [1958] can help explain the economics behind the more general results presented in the next section. In the example depicted in Figure I , the disturbance vt takes on two values, ? , each with probability of 0.5.7 The consumption demand curve is DC (P), and the (one-year-lagged) supply curve is S(Pr). If storage is impossible, planned production is X, and realized production and consumption are either L = (1 -A)X or H (1 + A)X, with realized prices of PA or PB, respectively. pr, the equilibrium production incentive, equals 1/2[PAL + PAH]/X, and is constant from year to year. Clearly pr is distinct from both the mean price and the certainty price.
If profit-maximizing storage is made economically possible from period 1, the consumption demand curve DC (P) is horizontally augmented below T by the storage demand curve +-1(P) to yield the market demand curve Dm (P). Expected revenue increases at any level 7. To show the qualitative changes due to storage more clearly, Figure I is not drawn strictly to scale. of planned production. Assuming the introduction of storage and its effects are accurately anticipated in period 0, one can see that the equilibrium producer incentive is pr' and the equilibrium production planned for period 1 is X'. Realized production will be either L'
(1 )X' or H' (1 + g)X'.
When production is H', Q' is consumed, and (H' -Q') is carried over to period 2. The market demand curve for production -in the next period is shifted to the left by the carryover. In period 1 the anticipation of this demand shift will reduce the price expected in period 2, as well as the incentive for production commitments in period 1 for output in period 2. The market price in subsequent periods at any given realization of the production disturbance will reflect the two offsetting effects of the introduction of storage: augmentation of the consumer demand curve by storage demand, and any carryover from the previous period. But the net result will be cushioned by the endogenous response in planned production.
This description of market equilibrium with storage sets the stage for illustration of the effects of introducing storage on the welfare of producers and consumers. We maintain two assumptions that are adopted in most studies of market stabilization, often implicitly. The first is that there are no market distortions or sources of instability in the economy outside of the market under study. The second is that welfare effects can be measured by changes in consumer and producer surplus; thus all distributional questions, other than comparisons of aggregate producer and consumer gains, are ruled out. We make the further assumption that the relevant surplus measures are adequately approximated by calculations based on market supply and demand curves. The conditions under which this procedure is appropriate seem acceptable for most commodities in a developed economy, but may well be violated in less developed countries for agricultural staples that have large shares of consumers' budgets (see Willig [1976] ).
Because the effect of introducing storage is dynamic, it is useful to begin the welfare analysis by considering the implications of advancing the introduction of storage from period 2 to period 1, assuming storage remains possible for all later periods. The welfare change from advancing the introduction of storage can be divided into period 1 effects and subsequent effects. In period 1, if v = -t and supply is L', the increase in consumer surplus due to the increase in planned supply from X to X' in response to the increase in the producer incentive from pr to pr' is area PAMNPA in Figure I . When v = + , production is higher under storage by (H' -H), but consumption is reduced by the carryover (Q' -H'). Consequently, the decrease in consumer surplus relative to the no-storage situation is PBSUZPB. The expected change in producer surplus in period 1 is given by pr'GKPr 8
The carryover from period 1 will raise consumption and consumer surplus, and depress producer surplus, in some period(s) in the future. The induced changes in expected future consumer and producer surplus cannot be separately indicated, even for the simple heuristic case illustrated here, although they are separated in the numerical calculations in the next section. But the net effect of carryover on the present value of the expected sum of consumer and producer surplus in all future periods, net of the cost of what is put into store, is given by the surplus under the derived demand curve for storage, Figure I by area TVU.
, HI_Q1 fHJQo q$(St) dS -PBS(H' -Q% which is represented in
The total welfare effects of a one-period advance in the introduction of storage for either producers or consumers are the present values of the effects expected in the future plus the effects in period 1. The welfare effects of introducing storage now, rather than never having storage at all, are equal to the present value of advancing the introduction of storage by one period in each of the periods from the infinite future to the present. The present value of the many oneperiod effects, which are all equal, is easily calculated, given a constant interest rate r, by dividing the value in any one period by r.
III. THE EFFECTS OF STORAGE: NUMERICAL RESULTS
Because the amount stored cannot be negative, derivation of competitive storage behavior is analytically intractable in general. However, using the numerical approach described in Appendix 1, it is possible to calculate the storage rule quite accurately. Numerical methods are also useful in deriving the distributive implications of storage. In Appendix 2 we describe an algorithm that can find a function R (S), which relates the change in the present value of expected producer surplus from period 2 to infinity to the amount of storage carried over from period 1. The corresponding change in consumer surplus from storage in period 1 is the difference between 8. By construction there is a one-period gap between expenditure on production and receipts. Producer surplus is calculated as a net present value as of harvest time. R (S) and the surplus under the storage demand curve. These measures of surplus represent the expected distributional impacts of competitive storage.
We calculated these distributional impacts for various values of the supply elasticity and various specifications of demand. We chose an eighty-point discrete approximation to the normal density function for the distribution of the disturbance in production, with mean zero and standard deviation 0.05 (the right order of magnitude for cereal production).9 The long-run (one period lagged) supply curve was constructed to be linear over the relevant range.10 The real interest rate was 5 percent, and physical storage costs were set at zero.
Results for Constant Demand Elasticity
Consider initially the case where the introduction of storage and its implications are perfectly anticipated in the previous period when production commitments are made. The numerically calculated welfare effects of introducing storage, for selected demand and supply elasticities, are shown in Table I , where demand is assumed to have constant elasticity. (We denote by the shorthand term "welfare effects" the expected welfare changes conditional on the information available before the introduction of storage.) The present value of the effect of introducing storage is given as a percent of the expected annual revenue in each case.11
As shown in Table I , storage plays a significant allocative role even when production is of rather modest variability. To provide a familiar standard for evaluating the significance of the welfare changes caused by storage, the last column in Table I shows the excise tax rate that, if imposed on the commodity when storage is impossible, would incur a welfare cost equivalent in magnitude to the benefits of intro-9. Because the error is multiplicative, the standard deviation of production changes as mean production changes. The standard deviation around a trend in world production of grain is just over 3 percent [Eaton, 1980] . The standard deviation for a particular crop or region would be higher. On the other hand, the observed fluctuation in production is partly a response to endogenous changes in economic incentives (see Wright and Williams [1981] ). Results obtained using a symmetric triangular distribution with the same mean and variance were very similar.
10. All supply and demand elasticities are measured at the point that would denote equilibrium if production were not stochastic. The assumption that supply is linear is not crucial in this model because movements in planned production are small relative to movements along the consumption demand curve, as illustrated in Figure I. 11. Nonlinearities in supply outside the observed range of production affect land values but have no effect on the derivation of the optimal storage rule or on changes in welfare. Expected annual revenue without storage is preferred to land value because revenue is independent of otherwise irrelevant portions of the supply function. Table I , consumers gain and producers lose from storage, a result that depends crucially on having constant elasticity of demand.
Results for More General Specifications
The distributive effects of the introduction of storage are illustrated in Figure II previous analytical studies that showed substantial redistributive effects from market stabilization.
When the assumption of zero supply elasticity is relaxed, two questions concerning specification immediately arise. The first concerns the form of the production disturbance, and the second involves the anticipations of producers regarding the date of the introduction of storage and its economic consequences. If these anticipations are accurate at the time of commitment to production and the disturbance in production is multiplicative, the distributive results for -S = 1 are presented by curve DE in Figure II . A comparison of curve DE with curve AB shows that the gross distributive effects are weaker at the higher supply elasticity. Consumers share at least some of the benefit from introducing storage whether they are commodity-risk-preferring (C = 0) or commodity-risk-averse (C = 6). Producers never gain or lose an amount greater than the net benefit, over the range of C considered. Since the net benefit is less than 20 percent higher at qs = 1 than at S = 0, the maximum redistribution at stake is much lower at the higher supply elasticity.
To illustrate the importance of the specification of the production disturbance, the results for pS = 1 under the commonly assumed additive disturbance are shown by curve FG in Figure II . As in curve DE, the gross distributive effects are less sensitive to C at the higher supply elasticity. If the disturbance is really multiplicative, however, assumption of an additive specification uniformly overstates the benefit to producers and the loss to consumers by an amount greater than the net benefit of introducing storage, so that it would appear that consumers lose from the introduction of storage for all values of C shown, whereas in fact the opposite would be the case! The differential gain to producers from storage under the additive disturbance is shown by Figure 11 to be approximately independent of the demand curvature parameter C, given the demand and supply elasticities. An analogous result can be derived analytically in the case of ideal stabilization. Wright The specification of producers' anticipations also has crucial implications. The results for qS = 1 presented above were produced under the assumptions that the date of the innovation of storage, and the implications of storage, are fully anticipated, and that long-run supply responds fully in one year. It may well be that the possibility of storage becomes known after production has been committed for that year, or that producers take time to discern its economic consequences. The learning process is complicated because the augmented demand curve derived here is not valid until it is fully recognized, since the market demand curve includes the storage demand, which is itself dependent upon the producer response. Although the nature of the learning process and the conditions for its convergence on the rational expectations equilibrium with full knowledge are interesting questions, we shall not pursue them here.13 Instead, we use just one example to show how sensitive the results are to the rather stringent expectational assumptions adopted above.
If the introduction of storage for period t is not announced until after production plans have been made for that period in period t -1, and if the possibility of storage was previously unrecognized, planned production remains at the level with storage impossible. If we assume that storage and all its effects are fully recognized after its 13. For an interesting discussion of these issues in a simple production model (without storage), see DeCanio [1979] . He assumes that initially producers respond to an incentive formed by an adaptive expectations process, and studies the conditions under which this incentive converges on the rational expectation. full impact of price stabilization on identical producers is a simple positive fraction of the immediate impact (before supply adjusts), the fraction being c/(E + A), where e is the constant elasticity of demand, and X is the underlying supply elasticity." Although this conclusion implicitly refers to the dynamic question about the effects of introducing storage, it should properly relate to the comparative statics analysis of zero and positive long-run supply elasticities. In fact, as seen in Figure III , if supply does not adjust in the period when storage is introduced, both the sign and magnitude of the properly discounted long-run effect of introducing storage on producer welfare depend crucially on the long-run supply elasticity. On the other hand, if the introduction of storage is fully anticipated, the expected effect on producer surplus is always negative regardless of the long-run supply elasticity, as seen in curve BF. As was indicated in Figure II , the sign of the distributional effects is insensitive to the supply elasticity when C is large. A more general view of the distributive effects of introducing storage is shown in Figure IV . On each of the contours, the ratio of the present value of the expected change in producer surplus to the expected present value of the net social benefit of introducing storage is constant at the fraction indicated. For parameter combinations to the left of curve FG, producers gain more than the expected net social benefit, at the expense of consumers. Between curves FG and KL, both producers and consumers gain from storage, while to the right of KL consumers gain more than the net social benefit, at the expense of producers.
Numerical results were also obtained for higher storage costs. Higher values of r or k result in a squeezing of the right-hand side of the map in Figure IV toward the left along with a displacement of the whole map to the left, reducing the range of C for which producers gain from storage, as well as the net benefits from introducing storage. Higher demand elasticities have similar effects.14
IV. INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS
The distributive consequences of the introduction of storage can be viewed as the net result of two effects. The first is the effect of the equilibrium change in the dispersion of consumption, and the second is the initial boost in demand arising from the need to build up a stock where none previously existed.
The first effect of introducing storage, an incomplete and asymmetric change in the dispersion of consumption, can be examined with reference to the effects of ideal stabilization, that is, complete and costless elimination of the production disturbance, which renders storage unnecessary. The effects of such complete stabilization are what is actually captured by studies in the tradition of Massell [1969] . Results derived in Wright [1979] indicate that producers and consumers both gain from ideal stabilization under combinations of parameters lying between the contours F"G" 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have shown the welfare effects of the introduction of rational competitive profit-maximizing storage in a market with stochastic supply. The major differences in welfare effects from those indicated in previous analyses of complete stabilization of consumption or ideal production stabilization are due to the initial buildup of stocks, which favors producers, and the fact that storageinduced stabilization is partial rather than complete, which tends to favor consumers. Our results also show the great importance of anticipations regarding the introduction of storage, and confirm previous analytical conclusions [ Wright, 1979] regarding the importance of the demand specification and the elasticity of supply.
If long-run supply is completely inelastic, the numerical results presented here confirm the qualitative conclusion of previous studies that the net social benefit of introducing storage is dominated by its distributional effects. Even so, the net social benefit of introducing storage can be very significant relative to excess burdens of typical excise taxes. The distributional effects are strongly influenced by the parameter C, which reflects the curvature of the demand curve. Furthermore, under fixed long-run supply the perfectly anticipated introduction of storage can favor producers over a greater range of C than what is implied by studies of complete stabilization and related concepts that have been used as analytical analogues for storage. And when supply is elastic, the range over which producers and consumers both gain is greatly increased, and outside that range adverse effects are greatly moderated-an encouraging result for those interested in the political feasibility of measures to facilitate rational storage.
Because the topic of this paper is inherently dynamic, it is not surprising that the assumptions about expectations are crucial. If, for example, producers take time to recognize or react to the implications of storage, the distributional effects of its introduction can be reversed. In addition, factors that reduce the amount of storage, such as wastage or higher storage costs, as well as higher demand elasticities, tend to favor consumers at the expense of producers. Investigation of other issues, such as the implications of nonlinear storage costs, or extension to several production sectors, is beyond the scope of this study. Fortunately, the approach taken here, being rather flexible, is capable of handling these and other questions in the future. The effects of any one harvest on producer welfare can be thought of as having three components. The most obvious is the revenue from the harvest. But any carryover from the harvest will depress future revenue. Accordingly, the second component is the expected effect of this carryover on future producer surplus, represented by the function R(S). The final component is the cost of production G(x), which depends on planned production rather than realized production. Thus, producer surplus from one harvest is the sum of these three components discounted to the time of harvest, period t + 1. Its expected value, given the information available at planting time t is E[prod. This calculation of expected producer surplus using R (S) can be duplicated by making a large set of long simulations of the storage model, each starting with the same initial store, and computing the mean present value of producer surplus. Although we have used this approach as a check on the routine, the same task is much more easily and inexpensively achieved by the method described here.
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